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among the various plans. With such a myriad of plans it is understandable that our job is difficult, in fact, almost impossible to execute properly.

Because the Federal Government has no uniform policy on employee compensation, the Payment and Members of Congress have no sound basis for determining when salaries should be adjusted or, if so, by how much.

In my opinion, the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Judiciary Committee, the House Administration Committee, the Armed Services Committee, and the other committees which must deal with pay problems, face a most vexing, frustrating, and almost impossible task in trying to arrive at sound and equitable decisions. These committees are to be congratulated on their conscientious and untiring efforts to do a good job under most unfavorable conditions.

Mr. Speaker, the civilian payrolls of the Federal Government now amount to nearly \$12 billion a year, a substantial portion of our total expenditures. We need to assure ourselves that this money is spent properly and that the employees receiving it are paid fairly for the important work they perform. It is for these reasons and on the basis of the facts cited that I have introduced this bill which I believe is the first necessary step toward better pay administration.

This bill provides for a comprehensive review of the entire Federal pay system—the first, I might add, in more than 30 years. This study will be done by a joint commission composed of representatives of both Houses of Congress, the executive branch, and the general public. Based on its findings, this commission will recommend to the President and to the Congress, policies and principles upon which a sound Federal compensation system can be based; and methods for putting such a system into effect.

The bill provides for a report to be submitted to the Congress and to the President by January 1, 1960. Legislation based upon its recommendations would then be considered.

#### THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(Mr. SELDEN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, as far as I have been able to determine, the recent revolution in Iraq took our Government completely by surprise. Apparently we not only had no indication that such a development was imminent, but our policies toward Iraq right up to the eve of the revolution were based on the belief that the situation in that country was relatively stable and that the attitude there was generally favorable to the United States.

This is another instance which causes many Members of Congress and many of our constituents to question whether the Central Intelligence Agency is really doing the job which we have a right to expect it to do. I am fully aware that the

task of the Central Intelligence Agency is exceedingly difficult, that its work must necessarily be developed in the cloak of secrecy, and that it may be impossible to establish any standards for evaluating its performance.

These same general conditions, however, seem to be equally applicable to the work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the case of the FBI, by way of contrast, most of us feel that there is continuing evidence that it is doing its job effectively.

On the other hand, we have no basis for similar confidence in the work of the Central Intelligence Agency. Only a few weeks ago the life of our Vice President was endangered in Latin America. The CIA apparently did not supply him with a very definite warning as to what to expect. Back in 1950, the Committee on Foreign Affairs was told by the head of the CIA only a few days before the outbreak of fighting in Korea that there was no immediate threat in that area. There is doubt in my mind and in the minds of many others that the CIA was aware of the situation in Hungary before the tragic revolt in that country or that the President and the Secretary of State were adequately informed of events before the invasion of Suez by Israel, the United Kingdom, and France.

The answer to the question that I raise is not greater publicity for the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency or a congressional investigation. In my judgment, however, the people of the United States would have more confidence in the CIA if they knew that there was close congressional supervision of CIA operations.

It may be that the CIA is doing a good job, but there is no one outside the executive branch who can make a continuing evaluation of its work. Here is an agency that spends millions of dollars and has thousands of employees. Its operations are carried out under conditions where incompetence and inefficiency could remain hidden for a long time.

It is my belief that the executive branch should welcome the creation of a congressional committee which would recognize and respect the obligations of secrecy in respect to intelligence work and which would continuously assure itself that the Central Intelligence Agency was doing its job. No one has ever questioned the sincerity or the competence of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. No one has ever accused that committee of divulging secret information or of doing anything to interfere with the effectiveness of the atomic energy program.

It is my firm belief that the Congress could provide comparable supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency to the advantage of everyone concerned.

#### JOINT COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

(Mr. TELLER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. TELLER. Mr. Speaker, I have today introduced a proposed joint resolu-

tion to establish a bipartisan joint committee on labor and industrial relations consisting of 8 members, 4 from the House and 4 from the Senate. The membership of the proposed joint committee would be divided equally among Democrats and Republicans.

The purpose of the proposed Senate-House committee would be to diminish politics in the field of labor legislation. Under the joint resolution no proposal could emanate from the committee unless adopted unanimously. By developing a tradition of unanimity alongside a preoccupation with professional approaches in the delicate field of union-management relations, the joint committee could make significant contributions to the cause of a sound American labor policy.

I have had a measure of experience as a member of a similar body in New York—the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Industrial and Labor Relations. I was deeply impressed by the work of this committee, in which I participated for several years while serving in the State legislature. Establishment of a similar committee by the Congress would be a desirable forward step in the development of rational and deliberative action in the field of labor legislation.

I do not wish to be understood as contending that bipartisanship and unanimity are unexceptionally suited for effectuating the proper role of Government in worker-employer relations and labor standards. The substantial gains achieved by workingmen and labor unions have been hard fought, and my own view is that they could not have been secured without the dedicated and arduous work of the Democratic Party. My proposed joint resolution does not affect the standing labor committees in the House and Senate, and I shall continue my efforts as a member of our House Committee on Education and Labor to advance liberal and progressive causes to improve the workingman's situation.

Here are some of the things which the proposed bipartisan Joint Congressional Committee on Labor and Industrial Relations would try to avoid in the process of formulating labor legislation:

First. The drafting of labor laws for partisan political objectives, taking insufficient heed of underlying realities and professional and understanding approaches.

Second. The writing of labor laws to meet a deadline rather than to solve a problem with due regard for all of its main aspects and complications.

Third. The weakening of the fabrics of collective bargaining and stable unionism by the adoption of laws which go far beyond the legitimate interest in guaranteeing democracy in the internal affairs of labor unions, and which impede the workings of the bargaining process.

Fourth. The excessive tendency toward omnibus labor legislation containing proposed solutions, some good and some bad, for wholly unrelated situations.

Fifth. The enactment of laws in settings of crisis or instances of particular